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Introduction
Georgia enacted the special purpose local option sales tax for education (ESPLOST) in 1996, giving school
districts in the state the opportunity, with voter approval, to adopt a 1¢ sales tax with revenue earmarked
for capital outlay. The ESPLOST has proven to be extremely popular with voters, as all but one county in
the state have passed at least one ESPLOST referendum, each of which remains in effect for a maximum
of five years. As shown in Table 1, most counties have approved the tax four times, while a handful have
had five or six ESPLOSTs approved. The vast majority of counties (132) have had an ESPLOST in effect
continuously since first passage, with only three counties allowing the tax to lapse. Therefore, the
ESPLOST has become, in effect, a permanent statewide 1 percent sales tax.

Table 1. The Popularity and Permanence of ESPLOST
NUMBER OF
ESPLOSTS
PER COUNTY TO DATE

COUNTIES WITH AN ESPLOST
IN PLACE UNTIL AT LEAST 2017

COUNT OF COUNTIES BY ANY
INTERRUPTIONS IN ESPLOST SINCE FIRST
IMPLEMENTED

No ESPLOSTs = 1*

Yes = 143

None = 132

2 ESPLOSTs = 5

No = 16

Yes but Reinstated = 24

3 ESPLOSTs = 15

Yes and Not Reinstated = 3**

4 ESPLOSTs = 126
5 ESPLOSTs = 11
6 ESPLOSTs 1
* Burke County
** Burke, Hancock and Towns counties
Source: Georgia Department of Revenue Sales Tax Rate History Chart Effective April 1, 2016
Note: Counties pass and collect ESPLOST and then distribute the funding to the associated county and city systems, so the count
of school districts in these categories is slightly larger with similar proportions.

The ESPLOST is a unique approach to financing capital outlay for education. Capital outlay is traditionally
financed through municipal bond debt, sometimes referred to as “pay-as-you-use” because debt service
payments often match the useful life of the asset. The ESPLOST allows school districts to substitute
current revenues for debt financing. Current financing is sometimes referred to as “pay-as-you-go”
because the assets are fully paid for as they are constructed. Moreover, rather than relying on general
revenues, it provides an earmarked funding source that is only available for capital outlay and must be
approved directly by voters.1 The ESPLOST has now been available in Georgia for 20 years and through
several economic boom and bust cycles, making this an opportune time to reexamine its relationship to
funding equity, capital outlay and debt.
This report examines a range of policy issues related to the ESPLOST, including the distribution of
revenues, and the relationship between the ESPLOST and school district debt and capital outlay needs. It
begins by reviewing previous research on the Georgia ESPLOST specifically and alternative revenue

1

Counties may issue bonds backed by ESPLOST revenues at the time the ESPLOST is approved. Because debt service on the
bonds must be paid solely with ESPLOST revenue, it would still be considered pay-as-you-go financing.
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sources for capital outlay more generally. It then examines the ESPLOST’s effect on school finance equity
in Georgia over time. Next, the report discusses the relationship between school district debt and
ESPLOST revenue. Analysis of changes in capital outlay over time follows, and a final section provides a
summary and policy recommendations. An appendix describes the data sources for each analysis and the
methods used to calculate the inequality measures.

Previous Research on Sales Taxes for Capital Outlay
Given the relatively infrequent use around the United States of local sales taxes to fund facilities
investments, or capital outlay, it is not surprising that the research on these taxes is limited. Several
articles, however, have examined Georgia’s ESPLOST specifically or local sales taxes for capital outlay
more generally.
Rubenstein and Freeman (2003) analyzed the effects of Georgia’s ESPLOST on school finance equity
during the program’s early years in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Voter approval of ESPLOST was
already widespread, with 165 of 180 districts enacting one within the first six years of the program. The
authors found that districts with large property tax bases also tended to have large sales tax bases and
that the ESPLOST revenue increased disparities in funding across districts above what they would
otherwise be. Although the state’s capital outlay program was designed to provide more resources to
low-wealth districts, it was not large enough to offset differences across districts in tax bases. Brunner
and Warner (2012) produced a follow-up study on school facility funding in Georgia and found that the
ESPLOST had significantly increased school capital outlay funding in Georgia overall, but that wide
disparities in funding across districts remained. They also found that districts with larger sales tax bases
tend to be urban with higher levels of income and education. Finally, they reported that school
construction needs in Georgia were expected to decline as enrollment growth slowed.
Zhao and Wang (2015) studied the effect of Georgia’s ESPLOST on capital outlay disparities and reported
lower capital outlays on average in South Georgia districts with higher percentages of African American
residents and higher poverty. They also found that disparities across districts were substantially larger for
capital outlay than for operating expenditures.
Brunner and Schwegman (2016) examined the Georgia ESPLOST’s effects on school district capital outlay
and debt. They found that adoption of an ESPLOST led to higher capital outlay and reduced debt for
districts located in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in Georgia. For districts outside of MSAs, they
found evidence of higher capital outlay but not reduced debt. Though ESPLOST revenue is restricted to
capital outlay and debt reduction, they also reported that the tax increased current spending per pupil in
districts within MSAs.
Benson (2015) examined the relationship between the ESPLOST and expenditures on various categories
of capital outlay. He also surveyed a sample of district administrators and school board members on their
opinions about the ESPLOST. He found that inflation-adjusted expenditures for capital outlay increased
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after the ESPLOST went into effect, though not by a statistically significant amount, and that expenditures
for new construction and renovation became more equitable across districts. He also reported that
administrators in urban districts felt the ESPLOST was more effective than did administrators in rural
districts.
Zhao and Hou (2008) analyzed the general purpose local option sales taxes (LOST) in Georgia, including
potential tax exportation, meaning the sales taxes paid by people shopping outside their county of
residence. They estimated that 76 counties were tax importers (net beneficiaries of exporting), and 83
were exporters. The largest beneficiaries of tax exportation were regional retail centers, not necessarily
districts in the metro-Atlanta area. They also found that tax base inequalities increased between 1970
and 2000 and that sales taxes were more unequally distributed than property tax revenues. The authors
used two models to examine tax base inequality. Using a representative tax system model, they found
that LOST revenue did not increase overall revenue disparities during this period, whereas the incomewith-exporting model suggested that it did.
In a study of North Carolina rather than Georgia, Wang and Zhao (2010) examined a 0.5¢ local sales tax
earmarked for school construction and debt retirement. Using data on 100 counties, they found that the
LOST reduced inequalities in capital outlay funding across districts. They noted an important institutional
feature that differs from Georgia, however. In Georgia, counties retain the sales tax revenue for sales that
occur within their boundaries. In North Carolina, the state collects sales taxes and distributes them to
counties based on population rather than sales. Thus, counties with few retail outlets can still receive
sales tax revenues.

Findings from the Current Study
ESPLOST’S ROLE IN FU NDING INEQUALITY
Like property taxes, an ESPLOST is a local tax, with revenue remaining in the district in which it was
collected.2 Therefore, as with property taxes, we would expect to find disparities across districts in the
amount of revenue collected, even after adjusting for the size of the district. In Georgia, as in all states, a
variety of state education funding formulas help to offset differences in property tax capacity by
allocating higher levels of operating funding to districts with lower levels of property wealth per pupil,
particularly those districts levying higher property tax rates. (See Davis and Ruthotto 2015 and Rubenstein
and Sjoquist 2003 for a fuller discussion of Georgia’s QBE funding formulas for education.) While Georgia
does have a capital outlay program to provide resources to districts with high needs and low sales tax
bases, most capital outlay is financed using local resources.3 Additionally, while ESPLOST revenue can be
used only for school construction, renovation, capital equipment or debt service on bonds issued for

2

Because revenues are collected at the county level, city school districts must enter tax-sharing agreements with their
corresponding county school districts.
3 For a thorough review of Georgia’s capital outlay program, see Walker and Sjoquist (1996). Some of the aspects of the capital
outlay program have changed since 1996, but much of the report is still relevant to the current capital outlay. See O.C.G.A. §
20-20-260-263.
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these purposes, the revenue may be fungible to some extent. In other words, if some districts would have
used property tax revenue for capital outlay in the absence of the ESPLOST, the tax could have indirectly
helped to fund operating expenditures or property tax reductions.
Figure 1 displays a map of Georgia color-coded to show geographic differences in potential ESPLOST
revenue per full-time equivalent pupil (FTE) by district.4 The map also shows the location of major
highways. Darker areas indicate higher levels of ESPLOST revenue per FTE. Not surprisingly, the districts in
metro Atlanta, all have high levels of ESPLOST revenue per FTE. Other high revenue districts are scattered
around the state and are typically served by major highways, for example, Savannah and Augusta or other
urban centers. Also note that the districts with the lowest ESPLOST revenue are often contiguous to
districts with the highest revenues, an issue we discuss further below.

4

The analyses in this report use potential ESPLOST revenue, calculated as 1 percent of the sales tax base, rather than actual
revenue, to account for the small number of districts not levying the ESPLOST.
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Figure 1. Per Student Potential ESPLOST by School District in School Year 2015

Table 2 compares the inequality of four funding sources in 2007 (the last pre-recession year) to that in
2015. Disparities are quantified using five statistics that measure inequality in slightly different ways. The
Restricted Range examines the extremes by looking at the difference in per FTE revenue for districts at
the 5th and 95th percentiles of revenue. This measure eliminates districts at the far ends of the
distribution, but uses data for only two districts (those at the 5th and 95th percentiles) in the calculation.
The Federal Funding Inequality Index puts the restricted range in context by dividing it by revenues at the
5th percentile. Lower values indicate greater equality. The Coefficient of Variation is calculated as the
mean of per pupil funding divided by the standard deviation, with higher numbers indicating greater
inequality. This measure includes the full distribution of districts. The McLoone Index focuses on districts
in the bottom half of the distribution, with higher numbers indicating that revenues for districts below
the median are closer to those in districts above the median (greater equality). The Gini Coefficient, often
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used to measure income inequality, also uses the full distribution of districts, with lower numbers
indicating greater equality. Because the Gini Coefficient is a cumulative measure of inequality, it is less
sensitive to inequality in the extremes and is highly influened by inequality in the middle of the
distribution.

Table 2. Inequality in Georgia School Districts Revenues, 2007 and 2015
LOCAL PER FTE

PLUS STATE

PLUS FEDERAL

PLUS POTENTIAL
ESPLOST

2007
Restricted Range p95-p5

$4,134

$2,833

$3,556

$4,436

3.54

0.43

0.49

0.56

Coefficient of Variation

0.493

0.126

0.139

0.142

McLoone Index

0.481

0.844

0.834

0.829

Gini Coefficient

0.253

0.063

0.068

0.071

Federal Funding Inequality Index

2015
Restricted Range p95-p5
Federal Funding Inequality Index

$4,832

$3,947

$4,472

$5,266

3.01

0.58

0.60

0.66

Coefficient of Variation

0.480

0.165

0.169

0.168

McLoone Index

0.506

0.809

0.808

0.804

Gini Coefficient

0.243

0.080

0.081

0.083

The first column in Table 2 shows the results for local, non-ESPLOST revenues only. Not surprisingly, local
revenues are the most unevenly distributed by every measure, but other than the Restricted Range, the
measures indicate that the distribution became slightly less unequal between 2007 and 2015.5 State
revenues are generally distributed inversely to property wealth, so inequality is substantially reduced
when these revenues are added to local funding. Between 2007 and 2015, however, state funds became
somewhat less equalizing, as most of the measures show larger inequalities in 2015 than in 2007. Federal
revenues are largely targeted to high-poverty districts — which may not be the districts with the lowest
revenues — so their expected effects on inequality are not straightforward.6 Table 2 shows that in both
years, the addition of federal funds had relatively little effect on overall inequality, likely because they
account for a small portion of overall revenues.
The last column in Table 2 adds potential ESPLOST revenue to local, state and federal funding. In both
years, the addition of ESPLOST revenues leads to larger disparities as measured by the Restricted Range
and Federal Funding Ratio. Interestingly, however, the measures examining the full range of districts
(Coefficient of Variation and Gini Coefficient) indicate that the ESPLOST worsened inequalities in 2007 but

5

Warner (2014) similarly found that in the wake of the Great Recession the decline in per student property values was most
concentrated in previously high wealth districts, effectively lowering property wealth disparities across districts.
6 Our analyses examine “horizontal equity,” which focuses on the equality of resources irrespective of student needs. “Vertical
equity” examines whether students with greater needs receive more resources. Federal funding would be expected to improve
vertical equity but could worsen horizontal equity.
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had almost no effect on inequalities in 2015, relative to either state and local, or federal, state and
local revenues.
Figure 2 also shows how the effect of the ESPLOST on inequality has changed over time by graphing the
Gini coefficient by year from 2001 to 2015 for total revenues with and without the ESPLOST. There was a
sharp improvement in equality across districts between 2001 and 2002, coinciding with expansion of
state equalization grants (Rubenstein and Sjoquist 2003). Inequality largely stayed the same between
2002 and 2008 but ESPLOST revenue was unequally distributed across districts over the period, leading to
a more unequal distribution of overall revenues (pink line). Beginning with the start of the Great
Recession in 2009, inequality of total revenues increased each year until 2012. Inequality of ESPLOST
funding dropped during the Great Recession so that ESPLOST revenue no longer exacerbated overall
revenue inequality. By 2014, however, ESPLOST inequality across districts began to grow but no longer
contributed to an overall increase funding disparities.

Figure 2. District Level Gini Coefficient 2001-15
Larger Values Equate to Higher Inequality
0.250
0.245
0.085

0.240
0.235

0.080

0.230
0.225

0.075

0.220
0.215

0.070

ESPLOST Gini Coefficient

Total Revenue and Total Revenue Plus ESPLOST

0.090

0.210
0.205

0.065

0.200
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
School Year
Per FTE Total Revenue

Total Revenue Plus ESPLOST

Per FTE ESPLOST

Sources: Georgia Department of Revenue for ESPLOST and Georgia Department of Education DE-46 Detailed Revenue Files
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The trends presented in Figure 3 shed some light on why the ESPLOST’s impact on inequality has changed
over time. The figure shows year-to-year changes in ESPLOST revenue per FTE for four quartiles of
ESPLOST revenue. The first quartile (red) had the lowest sales tax base per student in 2001, and the
highest quartile (yellow) had the largest sales tax base per student. The quartiles are based on 2001
revenues so that the groups of counties are consistent over time.

Figure 3. Potential ESPLOST 2001-15 by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile
Year over Year per FTE Changes
$100
$80
$60
$40
$20
$0
-$20
-$40
-$60
-$80
First Quartile (Smallest)

Second Quartile

Third Quartile

Fourth Quartile (Largest)

The figure shows that from 2003-04 through 2006-07, ESPLOST revenue grew consistently across all
quartiles, with the highest ESPLOST quartile generally experiencing the highest growth. ESPLOST revenue
contributed to larger inequalities over this period (Figure 2). Revenues began to fall across the top two
quartiles in 2007-08 and, beginning with the start of the Great Recession in 2008-09, decreased in three
of the next four years, with essentially flat revenue in 2010-11. The declines were largest in the highest
ESPLOST districts. Therefore, as ESPLOST revenue overall shrank and disproportionately affected the
districts with the highest revenues, ESPLOST revenue no longer contributed substantially to greater
inequality. During this period, inequality overall was growing but ESPLOST revenue was playing an
increasingly smaller role in that inequality.
In sum, it appears that the Great Recession led to growing inequality in educational funding in Georgia. At
the same time, severe declines in sales tax revenue in the districts with the largest sales tax bases led to
greater equality in the distribution of ESPLOST revenue. Due to increasing inequality in operating
revenues for education, the ESPLOST no longer exacerbated these inequities in the post-recession years.
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ESPLOST AND SCHOOL D ISTRICT DEBT
Capital outlay in the public sector generally, and in Georgia school districts specifically, is traditionally
financed through a mix of municipal bonds and excess current revenue from taxes and other sources
(Sjoquist and Walker 1996). The ESPLOST allows school districts in Georgia to fully substitute current sales
tax revenue for long-term debt. For districts with capital outlay needs that exceed ESPLOST revenue,
long-term debt financing can supplement sales tax revenue. Given the ubiquity of debt as a financing
source for municipal governments around the United States, it is worth examining the extent to which
school districts in Georgia have moved away from debt and the extent to which they rely solely on pay-asyou-go financing.
Figure 4 compares debt levels per pupil in Georgia to the rest of the United States. Before ESPLOST
enactment, Georgia was close to the national average in debt per student held by school districts.
Between 1999 and 2007, debt per student in Georgia fell by approximately $1,000, adjusted for inflation,
while in the rest of the United States it rose by about $3,200 per student. During the Great Recession,
with ESPLOST revenues shrinking, districts increased their debt levels, peaking at almost $4,000 per pupil
in 2009. Debt levels outside Georgia in 2009, however, were over twice as high. Debt per student then
began to fall in Georgia, while staying roughly constant in the rest of the United States.

Figure 4. Real Per Pupil Long-Term Debt Held
$10,000
$9,000

Real Long Term Debt Held

$8,000
$7,000
$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0

Georgia

School Year
U.S. (excluding Georgia)

Source: National Center For Education Statistics F-33 Data Files
Inflation adjusted to 2013 dollars using the Producer Price Index for Construction
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If we assume that in the absence of the ESPLOST, Georgia’s debt levels would have followed a similar
trajectory to the rest of the United States, then the ESPLOST led to a dramatic decrease in debt levels in
Georgia compared to what they would have otherwise been. Given Georgia’s fast population growth
during much of this period, it is also possible that debt for capital outlay would have increased more
quickly than in the rest of the country in the absence of the ESPLOST.
Figure 5, which breaks down debt levels within Georgia by quartile of ESPLOST revenue, shows an
interesting pattern. Districts with the lowest ESPLOST revenues also had the lowest debt per student over
most of the period, but debt in these districts more than doubled in inflation-adjusted dollars, from
approximately $1,000 per student in 1996 to over $2,000 per student in 2007. Only districts in the highest
revenue quartile lowered their debt levels over this period, indicating that ESPLOST-driven debt
reductions were concentrated in districts with the highest ESPLOST revenues.

Figure 5. Real Per Student Long-Term Debt Held by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile
$7,000

Real Long-Term Debt Held

$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0

School Year
First Quartile (Smallest)

Second Quartile

Fourth Quartile (Largest)

All of Georgia

Third Quartile

Source: National Center For Education Statistics F-33 Data Files
Inflation adjusted to 2013 dollars using the Producer Price Index for Construction

Figure 6 examines how districts’ reliance on debt has affected related property tax rates since the
ESPLOST became available. School districts have the authority to charge a separate property tax millage
rate to fund debt service on bonds, so these millage rates provide information about districts’ reliance on
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property taxes rather than sales taxes to repay debt.7 The figure displays changes in average property tax
bond millage rates by quartile of ESPLOST revenue. Beginning in 1996 with the start of the ESPLOST
program, average bond millage rates fell dramatically for all four quartiles. Average rates were initially
highest in the districts with the most ESPLOST revenue, which also showed the most dramatic decline. For
example, average rates were approximately 1.3 mills in 1996 and fell to under 0.2 mills by 2015. As might
be expected given their more limited capacity to substitute sales taxes for property taxes, districts in the
lowest quartile of ESPLOST revenue showed the smallest drop in bond millage rates over the period, from
approximately 1 mill to 0.5 mills. The figure shows that districts have drastically reduced their debt
service payments as they have increasingly relied on ESPLOST revenue to fund capital outlay. The chart
also shows the gap between high and low revenue districts. High revenue districts have gone from having
the highest bond millage rates before ESPLOST to an average close to zero, while the lowest revenue
districts now have the highest property tax rates to pay back debt.

Figure 6. Average Bond Millage Rates 1995-2015 by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile
1.4

Average Bond Millage Rate*

1.2

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

School Year
First Quartile (Smallest)

Second Quartile

Third Quartile

Fourth Quartile (Largest)

*Includes only districts charging a bond millage rate

7

Districts also have the ability to finance capital outlay by issuing other forms of short-term debt like revenue anticipation notes
or certificates of participation. Data on the use of these types of debt are limited. The analyses here focus on long-term debt
issuance — debt obligations with a repayment period longer than one year.
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Table 3 shows the number of districts over time charging a millage rate to fund bond debt service
payments, and the average millage rate for those levying the tax. Charging a bond millage rate indicates
that the district has outstanding debt, but it does not necessarily mean the debt was issued in the current
year. The property tax revenue could be used to meet debt service obligations on debt issued in the past.
As shown in the table, most Georgia districts (102 out of 180) had outstanding debt backed by the
property tax in 1996, just prior to the start of the ESPLOST program. When ESPLOST became an option,
the number of districts repaying debt directly through property tax millage declined dramatically, falling
to 28 districts (15.5 percent) by 2015.

Table 3. Millage Rates for Bond Debt Service
SCHOOL
YEAR

NO. OF DISTRICTS CHARGING
A BOND MILLAGE RATE

AVERAGE
RATE

25TH
PERCENTILE

75TH
PERCENTILE

1995

97

1.869

0.96

2.59

1996

102

1.969

1

2.8

1997

69

1.750

1

2.32

1998

57

1.633

1

2.31

1999

52

1.553

0.971

2.11

2000

51

1.519

1

1.98

2001

48

1.481

0.955

1.92

2002

43

1.311

0.71

1.835

2003

41

1.408

0.8

1.835

2004

42

1.394

0.8

1.75

2005

42

1.362

0.699

1.75

2006

38

1.365

0.65

1.878

2007

37

1.42

0.67

1.838

2008

39

1.505

0.65

2.45

2009

37

1.469

0.599

2.2

2010

35

1.542

0.65

2.2

2011

32

1.623

0.66

2.359

2012

29

1.610

0.65

2.173

2013

29

1.751

0.671

2.3

2014

28

1.739

0.658

2.359

2015

28

1.781

0.673

2.704

From the taxpayer’s perspective, in those districts levying a bond millage rate, the rates were low,
averaging less than 2 mills over the entire period and not exceeding 3 mills even for districts at the 75th
percentile of tax rates. For the owner of a home with a market value of $153,900 (about the median
home price in Georgia), a 2-mill tax would translate into property tax payments of $123 per year.8

8

Residential property in Georgia is usually taxed on 40 percent of its assessed market value. In 2015, Decatur City Schools taxed
at 50 percent, and Gainesville City and Dalton City Schools taxed at 100 percent. This calculation ignores any property tax
exemptions to which the homeowner may be entitled.
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COMPARISON OF PROPER TY AND SALES TAXES F OR CAPITAL OUTLAY
Figure 7 examines household ESPLOST and property tax payments by comparing the bond millage rate
that would be required in each district to replace ESPLOST revenue in 2015. This comparison assumes
that districts would be able to fund the same level of capital outlay from either the current ESPLOST or a
property tax millage rate at the level shown in the chart. While there are several extreme outliers —
districts that would need a bond millage rate over 10 to replace ESPLOST revenue — most districts are
clustered between 2 and 4 mills. Therefore, for most districts, it would be feasible to substitute property
tax revenue for sales taxes. For those with particularly low ESPLOST revenue, it would likely be possible to
raise more revenue from a relatively low property tax of 4 to 5 mills.9 Note, however, that if a district
chose to eliminate the ESPLOST and issue municipal bonds backed by property tax revenues instead, a
homeowner in that county would pay the additional millage rate plus the ESPLOST on any purchases in
other counties with the tax.

Figure 7. Necessary Bond Millage Rate Required to Raise ESPLOST Equivalent
Amount of Revenue in 2015 By ESPLOST Rank
18

Bond Millage Rate to Raise One Year of ESPLOST
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9

A 5-mill tax on a property valued at $150,000 would cost the homeowner an additional $300 per year in property taxes.
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Figure 8 shows a district perspective of how much potential revenue could be raised in each district
through a 2-mill property tax as compared to a 1¢ sales tax. For the approximately 20 districts with the
lowest potential ESPLOST revenue, the two taxes generate roughly the same amount of revenue. Virtually
all of the remaining districts would raise more from the ESPLOST, with particularly large gaps for the 10
districts with the highest ESPLOST revenues per FTE. Table 4 looks at this issue more directly by quartile
of ESPLOST wealth. Across all quartiles, the median household spends more on the ESPLOST than it would
on a 2-mill property tax, with a difference of almost two to one in the bottom two quartiles.

Figure 8. Per FTE Annual Potential ESPLOST vs. Per FTE Bond Property Tax
Revenues in 2015 By ESPLOST Rank
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Table 4. Average Property Tax and ESPLOST by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile
1 (SMALLEST)

2

3

4 (LARGEST)

TAXES PAID BY AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD
Average Median House Value at 2 Mills

$72.54

$75.67

$106.58

$109.17

ESPLOST Paid Overall

$155.96

$154.89

$166.75

$163.61

ESPLOST Paid in Local County

$123.33

$141.78

$150.61

$149.31

The statewide median home value is $153,900 and is heavily influenced by the large number of homes in the metro-Atlanta area.
The district averages in this table are lower because they are across districts, ignoring their relative number of homes, and the
majority of districts have a lower median home value than the statewide median.

cslf.gsu.edu

Georgia’s ESPLOST: Review of Trends and Policy Implications

16
TAX EXPORTING
One difficulty in comparing property tax burdens to sales tax burdens is that sales taxes are generally
more exportable than property taxes. While some property owners may live outside the school districts in
which they pay property tax (such as vacation or investment property owners), it is more common for
people to pay sales taxes outside their home counties. The higher the share of retail sales in a school
district made by individuals who reside outside the district, the larger the share of district capital outlay
that is financed by nonresidents. Like the sales tax base itself, the ability to export sales taxes varies
considerably across districts. In most cases, buyers do not report their county of residence when making
purchases; therefore, the extent of tax exporting must be estimated based on consumer purchasing
surveys and the location of retail businesses.
In districts with little retail activity, particularly grocery stores, it is likely that residents must travel outside
the county to shop. Figure 9 looks at this issue by showing census blocks (shaded) in which the nearest
grocery store is in another county. Residents in these neighborhoods most likely shop outside the county,
sending potential tax revenue to neighboring districts. The map shows very few shaded areas in metro
Atlanta, aside from some census blocks on county borders, indicating that, not surprisingly, most metroAtlanta residents can shop in their home county.10 Grocery stores tend to be concentrated in urban areas,
particularly in the metro-Atlanta districts, Bibb County (Macon), Chatham County (Savannah), Glynn
County (Brunswick and St. Simons Island), Richmond County (Augusta) and Muscogee County (Columbus).
In contrast, several counties are nearly completely shaded, indicating that there are almost no retail
grocery outlets in the county and that most residents must, by necessity, do most of their shopping
outside the county. Most of these districts also rank very low in terms of ESPLOST revenue per pupil,
including Glascock County (5th lowest), Wilcox County (10th), Wheeler County (18th), Taliaferro (20th),
Webster (23rd) and Lee County (36th). It is important to note that if these districts repealed the ESPLOST
in favor of additional property taxes, residents in these counties would still pay ESPLOST on purchases
outside the county, thereby potentially exacerbating their tax burdens.

10

Note that this map does not show where people actually shop, but simply whether they have the option to shop in their home
county.
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Figure 9. “Leaving” Census Blocks for Grocery Stores in Georgia in School Year 2015

Note: Red indicates a census block whose closest grocery store is outside of its county. White indicates either a census block with
no households or a census block with a closest grocery store located within its county.

Given the concentration of retail outlets throughout metro Atlanta and the geographic proximity of the
districts to each other, these districts likely both import and export tax burdens. Atlanta and Fulton
County, which serve as retail and employment centers, particularly benefit from tax importation,
however, and their school districts have the third and fifth highest ESPLOST revenues per student,
respectively. In more rural parts of the state, counties with retail centers particularly benefit from
importation if nearby counties lack retail establishments. For example, Bibb County benefits not only
from having a retail center in Macon, but also from being located near counties such as Twiggs that have
very few retail outlets.
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Table 5 attempts to quantify tax exporting by examining “leaving shares” by quartile of ESPLOST revenue.
The analysis uses the location of all grocery stores, home stores, gas stations and clothing stores in
Georgia that were included in the fiscal year 2015 Department of Labor employment files, geocoded with
their specific latitude and longitude coordinates.11 Each census block in Georgia is then linked to its
closest retailer of each type. In most cases, this retailer was in the same county as that census block’s
centroid point. The share of a county’s households whose closest retailer was in a different county is used
to create a “leaving share,”12 which estimates the percentage of households in each county purchasing
goods outside the county. Higher leaving shares are therefore expected to be strongly correlated with
greater numbers of households crossing county borders to purchase retail goods on which they must pay
ESPLOST.

Table 5. Leaving Shares by 2015 Per FTE Potential ESPLOST Quartile

Count of Districts

1 (SMALLEST)

2

3

4 (LARGEST)

45

45

45

45

Average Leaving Share

30.4%

18.3%

10.4%

9.5%

Range of Leaving
Shares

0.3%86.4%

0.2%100.0%

1.0%36.6%

1.2%53.6%

As expected, districts with lower potential ESPLOST revenue also have the highest average leaving shares,
and those with the highest ESPLOST revenue have the lowest leaving shares. Districts in the lowest
quartile of ESPLOST wealth average 30.4 percent of households likely shopping outside the district, while
those in the highest quartile average less than 10 percent shopping elsewhere.
Table 6 sheds further light on this issue by looking at exporting outside Georgia’s urban and suburban
districts. Not surprisingly, rural “distant” and rural “remote” districts, as classified by the U.S. Department
of Education, have particularly high levels of potential exporting, with over 30 percent of households
having the nearest retail outlets outside the district. Rural fringe districts, as well as districts in or near a
town, have much lower levels of potential exporting, on average. Fifty-five of Georgia’s 180 districts are
considered rural distant or remote, and another 60 are classified as rural fringe.

11

Grocery store purchases of food and food ingredients for at-home consumption are exempt from the state sales tax but are
charged local sales taxes including ESPLOST.
𝐿𝐻𝑐𝑟
12 The equation for the leaving share for a certain type of retail purchase is calculated as 𝐿𝑆
𝑐𝑟 = 𝑇𝐻 , where c indexes county, r
𝑐𝑟
indexes retail type, LH is leaving households and TH is total households. A school system’s leaving share
is the average across the
various retail leaving shares. For city systems, the leaving share for their primary host county proxies for their leaving share
because ESPLOST is collected by county and then shared between the applicable school systems based on student population or
some other agreed upon method.
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Table 6. Rural School Districts’ Leaving Share by Urbanization School Year 2015

Count of Districts
Average Leaving Share
Range of Leaving Shares

TOWN:
FRINGE

TOWN:
DISTANT

TOWN:
REMOTE

RURAL:
FRINGE

RURAL:
DISTANT

RURAL:
REMOTE

2

24

11

60

40

15

4.4%

12.1%

8.3%

13.1%

31.7%

31.0%

2.2%6.6%

1.0%35.3%

2.4%20.6%

0.2%49.0%

0.6%86.4%

1.1%100.0%

Note: The National Center for Education Statistics provides each school district’s level of urbanization. “Town” indicates the
existence of a small population center, and “rural” indicates no population center. “Fringe” indicates close proximity to a large
urbanized area, “distant” indicates farther away from an urbanized area, and “remote” indicates extremely distant from an
urbanized area.

In sum, these analyses demonstrate that many districts have limited capacity to raise revenues through a
sales tax because they lack substantial retail activity. Districts in counties with no urban areas, particularly
very rural districts, have substantial potential “leakage” of sales tax revenues to nearby districts.
Moreover, large shares of residents in many counties are likely paying ESPLOST revenue to neighboring
counties, adding to location-based disparities in resources available to pay for school capital outlay.

ESPLOST AND CAPITAL OUTLAY
Debt and ESPLOST revenues are used to finance capital outlay. Thus, we also examine trends in capital
outlay for education over the same period to assess the extent to which they are related to debt and payas-you-go revenues. Figure 10 displays per pupil capital outlay from 1995 to 2015 by quartile of ESPLOST
wealth. Following the start of the ESPLOST program, overall capital outlay increased consistently until
2009, then fell dramatically during the Great Recession. The capital outlay patterns by quartiles of
ESPLOST wealth are fairly volatile, however. This volatility is understandable as capital outlay is typically
“lumpy.” Districts may only need to make large expenditures irregularly as facilities are built or renovated.
Despite the volatility, some consistent patterns do emerge. Most notable is that capital outlay per pupil in
the highest ESPLOST revenue districts consistently exceeds that in the lower quartile districts. The lowest
quartile districts had the lowest capital outlay throughout the study period, except between 2010 and
2012. By 2015, capital outlay in the lowest quartile of districts was approximately $600 per pupil lower
than the next-lowest-spending quartile, and approximately $900 per pupil lower than the highest revenue
quartile. This gap was still far smaller than in the early 2000s, when capital outlay differences between
the highest and lowest revenue quartiles reached as much as $1,300 per pupil.
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Figure 10. Real Per FTE Capital Outlay by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile
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Source: Georgia Department of Education Detailed Expenditure DE-46 Files
Inflation adjusted to 2015 dollars using the BEA Construction Chain Price Index

Capital outlay in the highest quartile districts increased substantially with the start of the ESPLOST
program in 1996, growing from $728 per pupil to $1,963 in 2001. While spending in the highest revenue
districts regularly exceeded that in all other quartiles in the early 2000s, the gaps between the top three
quartiles narrowed considerably during the mid-2000s and disappeared beginning in 2009 as spending
fell dramatically in all districts. By 2015, spending in the top three quartiles remained similar, while a large
gap opened up between the bottom quartile and the top three.
Capital outlay spending is not necessarily the same as capital outlay need. Policymakers might be less
concerned about high levels of spending in districts with large sales tax bases and more concerned with
ensuring that all students are taught in safe, uncrowded schools in acceptable conditions and with the
necessary facilities. In the language of school finance, they may be more concerned with having adequate
school facilities for all students than with ensuring an equitable distribution of facilities. Capital needs are
influenced by a variety of factors, including student enrollment growth, the age of facilities and the
condition of facilities. While all districts typically have some level of unmet capital needs, the greatest
needs are likely to be in the fastest growing districts, which are likely to need new schools, and in districts
with facilities in the worst condition. Therefore, lower spending on capital outlay could reflect lower
facility needs or a lower capacity to finance construction through the ESPLOST or the issuance of debt.

cslf.gsu.edu

Georgia’s ESPLOST: Review of Trends and Policy Implications

21
Table 7 compares districts by quartile of ESPLOST wealth and by quartile of student enrollment growth.
The 14 districts in the upper left cell have both slow growth and low ESPLOST revenues; these are the
districts in which we would expect low capital outlay spending. The 18 districts in the bottom right cell
have high growth rates and high ESPLOST revenues; these are the districts in which we would expect high
capital outlay spending.

Table 7. Student Growth and ESPLOST Quartile Ranks
ESPLOST QUARTILE 2001
STUDENT GROWTH RATE
QUARTILE

1

2

3

1

14

11

13

7

45

2

17

13

8

7

45

3

7

14

11

13

45

4

7

7

13

18

45

45

45

45

45

180

Total

4

TOTAL

Pearson Rank Correlation Coefficient: .293

As the table shows, however, growth is not perfectly correlated with ESPLOST revenue. For example,
seven districts have low growth but high revenues (upper right cell), and seven districts have high growth
but low revenues (bottom left cell). We next look at the top and bottom half of the distribution. Thirtyfive districts (19.4 percent) in the upper half of student growth are in the lower half of ESPLOST revenues,
indicating that they likely have higher capital outlay needs but lower revenues. The Pearson rank
correlation between growth rates and ESPLOST revenues is 0.293, suggesting that the two are positively
related but that the relationship is not particularly strong. Thus, higher capital outlay expenditures are not
driven solely by higher student population growth, one indicator of higher needs.
Table 8 uses multiple regression analysis to examine the independent effects of student growth and
ESPLOST revenue on capital outlay expenditures. Both variables have independent and statistically
significant positive effects on capital outlay per FTE. The model includes district fixed effects, which
control for all unobserved time-invariant district characteristics (e.g., location), and school year fixed
effects, which control for underlying trends in capital outlay spending. The growth rate coefficient
indicates that a one percentage point increase in the student growth rate is associated with
approximately $21 higher per FTE capital expenditures, while a $1 increase in ESPLOST revenues is
associated with a $1.02 increase in capital expenditures.13

13

Note that the coefficient is greater than $1.00, suggesting that little to no ESPLOST revenues are leaked to other purposes.
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Table 8. Regression Results, Capital Outlay Per FTE
VARIABLES

REAL PER FTE CAPITAL OUTLAY

Three-Year Student Growth Rate

21.40**

Real Per FTE ESPLOST Revenues

1.019***

(8.965)
(0.147)
District Level Fixed Effects

Yes

School Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Constant

163.0
(148.9)

Observations

2,700

Number of districts

180

R-squared: Within, Between, Overall

(W:.0704)(B:.367)(O:.101)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

It is difficult to compare the effects of the growth rates and ESPLOST revenues because they are
measured in different scales. To make them comparable, we examine the effects of a one standard
deviation increase in each on capital outlay. For three-year enrollment growth, a one standard deviation
increase (9.3 percent) is associated with an increase of $199 in capital outlay. A one standard deviation
increase in real per FTE ESPLOST revenues ($434.03) is associated with $442 in capital outlay. Thus,
capital outlay appears to be slightly more strongly related to ESPLOST revenue than to enrollment
growth.
The other possible driver of capital outlay is facility needs, but data on the condition of school facilities in
Georgia are limited. For these analyses, we rely on the capital outlay needs identified in local facility
plans. Capital outlay needs include two measures: 1) total need as identified in the local facilities plans
submitted by each district to the Facilities Services Division of the Georgia Department of Education, and
2) eligible need approved for state capital outlay grants. A weakness of the first measure is that districts
with higher expected revenues to finance capital outlay, such as ESPLOST, might include more locally
financed facility needs in their plans. A weakness of the second measure is that it includes only capital
outlay approved by the state. Moreover, because the plans are developed by the districts, those with
more funding may develop more extensive and expensive plans than those with less funding.
Figure 11 plots the relationship between eligible needs and ESPLOST revenue. We focus on eligible needs
because the state applies the same criteria across districts for determining eligible capital outlay costs.
Consequently, these estimates are likely to be more comparable across districts than total needs. The
figure shows a very slight downward slope, indicating that districts with lower ESPLOST revenue per pupil
tend to have higher needs per student FTE. The slope is small and there is considerable variation across
districts, suggesting a weak relationship between revenue and needs, at best. The negative slope could
indicate that low ESPLOST revenue has not allowed low revenue districts to meet their past capital outlay

cslf.gsu.edu

Georgia’s ESPLOST: Review of Trends and Policy Implications

23
needs. Because these are cross-sectional data, however, it is possible that districts with higher levels of
ESPLOST revenue were able to reduce their capital outlay needs in previous years. Figure 12, which
displays the relationship between total needs and ESPLOST revenue, shows an even weaker relationship
between the two variables.

Per FTE "Eligible Need" from the lateset Local
Facilities Plan

Figure 11. Potential ESPLOST in 2015 and “Eligible Need”
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Figure 12. Potential ESPLOST in 2015 and “Total Need”
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Figure 13 examines the relationship between student growth and eligible capital outlay needs. The
relationship is weak but is, surprisingly, slightly negative. This result suggests that the fastest growing
districts have, on average, somewhat lower capital outlay needs than districts with lower or even
negative growth rates. Again, this may indicate that fast-growing districts have been able to meet their
capital outlay needs in previous years through higher state funding. While the relationship between
growth and needs is weak, it does suggest that the greatest facility needs are not necessarily found in the
fastest growing districts.

Figure 13. Student Population Growth 2001-15 and “Eligible Need”
Per FTE "Eligible Need" from the Latest Local Facilities Plan
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Summary and Recommendations
Overall, these data present a somewhat complex story regarding capital outlay and funding sources in
Georgia. The ESPLOST undoubtedly contributed to large increases in capital outlay spending along with
decreasing reliance on debt, compared to the rest of the United States (Brunner and Warner 2012).
These patterns were not uniform across districts, however, as districts with the highest ESPLOST revenues
were able to fund considerably more capital outlay than other districts while not taking on more debt.
An interesting pattern emerges for the districts with the lowest ESPLOST revenue. Not surprisingly, these
districts spent considerably less on capital outlay than other districts. However, they also had relatively
low millage rates for debt service suggesting a reluctance to spend on capital outlay if it could not be paid
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for with current sales tax revenue. Many of these districts would be able to raise more revenue for capital
outlay from a relatively low (4 to 5 mill) property tax than from the ESPLOST.
The data also show the substantial effect of the Great Recession on revenue inequality in Georgia.
Beginning in 2007, there was an increasing pattern of revenue inequality. Because the highest revenue
districts saw sharp declines in ESPLOST revenue, though, the ESPLOST no longer caused an increase in
overall inequality.
We find large disparities in sales tax bases across the state and considerable potential for tax exporting
across districts, particularly in rural parts of the state. These patterns suggest that many districts,
especially those with few retail outlets that are located near districts with a greater concentration of
stores, may experience substantial exportation of sales tax revenue to nearby districts. Net importing
districts benefit from collecting sales taxes from nonresidents, while net exporters may have a limited
capacity to raise revenue for capital outlay from the ESPLOST.
Policymakers might be particularly concerned if districts with the greatest capital outlay needs also have
the weakest ability to raise revenue through the ESPLOST. Unfortunately, the available data on capital
outlay needs are very limited. We do find that districts experiencing high enrollment growth have tended
to have higher capital outlay spending, but gaps between higher and lower growth districts have
narrowed considerably in the post-recession years. We also find little correlation between facility needs,
as identified on local facility plans, and ESPLOST revenues.
To address inequities in the ability of school districts across the state to fund needed capital outlays
through the ESPLOST, we recommend that the state examine several options.
 Explore sales tax base sharing. Our analysis of geographic disparities in sales tax bases shows clearly
that many school districts in Georgia, particularly those in the most rural areas, have limited capacity to
raise revenue through sales taxes. A number of districts have few or no retail outlets, such as grocery
stores, located within their boundaries, and these disparities are exacerbated by the location of retail
centers in nearby districts that draw sales tax revenue from nonresidents. To help break the link
between the quality of a district’s school facilities and the happenstance of retail locations, the state
could explore regional sales tax sharing plans. Such plans could draw on existing state-defined regions
like the Department of Education’s Regional Education Service Areas or the Department of Community
Affairs’ Service Delivery Regions, or could implement newly defined regional borders. Within each
region, some or all ESPLOST revenues could be distributed across member districts using a
predetermined formula.14

14

A per FTE allocation would be the simplest to implement, but many other options exist that would allow for better targeting to
district needs.
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A tax base sharing plan would, in most cases, reduce ESPLOST revenue in districts that include the
regional commercial center in order to provide additional revenue to surrounding districts. Thus, it
would be necessary to ensure that districts potentially losing revenue are able to meet their capital
outlay needs during a phase-in period. Additionally, ESPLOST renewal under such a plan would likely
require approval by voters in each district, or a majority across all districts.
 Develop incentives and technical support for borrowing in low ESPLOST districts. Since the ESPLOST
program began in 1996, sales tax revenues have largely replaced property tax-backed debt as the
primary method for financing school capital outlay. The extremely high rate of ESPLOST renewal across
the state suggests that voters prefer sales taxes to property taxes for this purpose. As the analyses in
this report demonstrate, however, the ESPLOST raises limited revenue in many districts and, in fact, can
sometimes represent a greater tax burden for typical households than would additional property taxes
for capital outlay. For these districts, using property taxes to fund pay-as-you-go construction or to pay
the debt service on bonds issued for that purpose may be a more effective option, despite many voters’
distaste for both debt and property taxes. Incentives could include:
 Matching grants for districts with low debt that issue bonds: Georgia already provides capital outlay
grants to districts with low wealth. For districts with severe needs (such as unsafe or overcrowded
facilities), the state could provide additional incentives in the form of matching grants if the districts
are willing to borrow to finance additional capital outlay. These grants could help districts leverage
additional resources for capital outlay at a relatively low cost to the state. Such grants should only be
available to districts with low existing debt levels.
 State credit enhancement to lower interest rates: Smaller districts or those with limited experience in
credit markets may face additional borrowing costs such as higher interest rates or premium
payments for commercial bond insurance. In such cases, the state could guarantee debt service
payments to creditors to lower interest costs. Texas, for example, has the Texas Permanent School
Fund, which uses dedicated revenue from state land to guarantee school district bonds, thereby
lowering interest rates and debt service costs (see Duncombe and Wang 2009).
 Create a state bond bank: A bond bank pools bond issues by local government entities to achieve lower
borrowing costs. Small school districts with limited tax bases and borrowing experience may face higher
interest rates due to higher potential credit risk. Bond banks are typically able to borrow at lower
interest costs and pass the savings on to local government issuers. Additionally, by pooling smaller bond
issues into a single larger issue, economies of scale can also reduce borrowing costs. Bond banks are
typically intended to be self-supporting through fees from local government borrowers. A bond bank
could provide low-cost, easy-to-access financing for school districts at little or no cost to the state.
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Appendix: Data Sources and Methods
Table A1. Data Sources
TABLE OR FIGURE NUMBER

DATA SOURCE

Table 1

Georgia Department of Revenue Sales Tax History Chart, version effective April 1, 2016.

Table 2

Georgia Department of Education DE-46 Revenues Files for Local, State, and Federal
Revenue. Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST
and LOST monthly collections.

Table 3

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services Consolidation Sheet data for
school bond digest data. The 2015 American Community Survey for school district
median home values and census block household counts. Georgia Department of
Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST monthly collections.
Consumer Expenditure Survey data for average southern household consumption by
retail categories. Georgia Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and
Employment for retail locations.

Table 4

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services Millage Rate Annual Report.

Table 5

The 2015 American Community Survey for household counts. Georgia Department of
Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment for retail locations.

Table 6

The 2015 American Community Survey for census block household counts. Georgia
Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment for retail locations.
National Center for Education Statistics F-33 Data Files for district level of urbanization.

Table 7

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts.

Table 8

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts.
National Center for Education Statistics and Georgia Department of Education DE-46
Revenues Files for annual capital outlay. Inflation adjustment for 2015 constant dollars
using Construction Chain Price Index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Figure 1

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts.

Figure 2

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts.
Georgia Department of Education DE-46 Revenues Files for total federal revenue.

Figure 3

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts.

Figure 4

National Center for Education Statistics F-33 Data Files for long-term debt held. Inflation
adjustment for 2015 constant dollars using Construction Producer Price Index from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Figure 5

National Center for Education Statistics F-33 Data Files for long-term debt held. Inflation
adjustment for 2015 constant dollars using Construction Producer Price Index from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services
data for ESPLOST and LOST monthly collections.

Figure 6

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services Millage Rate Annual Report.
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TABLE OR FIGURE NUMBER

DATA SOURCE

Figure 7

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services Consolidation Sheet data for
school bond digest data. The 2015 American Community Survey for school district
median home values and census block household counts. Georgia Department of
Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST monthly collections.
Consumer Expenditure Survey data for average southern household consumption by
retail categories. Georgia Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and
Employment for retail locations.

Figure 8

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services
Consolidation Sheet data for school bond digest data.

Figure 10

The 2015 American Community Survey for school district for census block household
counts. Georgia Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment for
retail locations.

Figure 11

National Center for Education Statistics and Georgia Department of Education DE-46
Revenues Files for annual capital outlay. Georgia Department of Revenue Local
Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST monthly collections. Inflation
adjustment for 2015 constant dollars using Construction Chain Price Index from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Figure 12

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts.
Georgia Department of Education Facilities Division local facility plan data for district
eligible need.

Figure 13

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts.
Georgia Department of Education Facilities Division Local facility plan data for district
total need.

Figure 14

Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts.

Inequality Measures:
This section describes how we calculate the inequality measures and provides their equations. In all
cases, n indicates the number of districts, ∑ is the summation operator, √ is the square root operator,
and r indicates rank.
The Restricted Range is calculated as the difference between the 95th percentile district in per full-time
equivalent (FTE) and the 5th percentile district:
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = (

𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝑅𝑒𝑣
)95𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 − (
)
𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝐹𝑇𝐸 5𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡

The Federal Funding Inequality Index is the Restricted Range divided by the 5th percentile district’s
amount:
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
𝑅𝑒𝑣
(
)
𝐹𝑇𝐸 5𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡
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Coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation of the district’s per student revenues to the
average:
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝑅𝑒𝑣 2
((
− 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(
))
√
𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∑
𝑅𝑒𝑣 (𝑛 − 1)
∑
𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑛
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
The McLoone Index is calculated as the ratio of the per FTE revenues of the districts below the median of
per FTE revenues to the per FTE revenues of the above-median districts.
𝑅𝑒𝑣
∑(
)𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠
𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝑀𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝑅𝑒𝑣
∑(
)
𝐹𝑇𝐸 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠
The Gini coefficient is calculated as the distance between the ranked cumulative per FTE wealth curve
and the curve that would exist under perfect equity.
𝑅𝑒𝑣
∑(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑟)
1
𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 = (𝑛 + 1 − 2
)
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝑛
∑
𝐹𝑇𝐸
The “Leaving Share” Calculation and the Estimate of ESPLOST Paid in Home County
The Consumer Expenditure Survey provides estimates of household unit average annual expenditure by
category and household before-tax income. These estimates can then be isolated to only include
ESPLOST-eligible expenditures (Table A2). These annual estimates multiplied by the count of households
within these income categories for a school district serves as the estimate for ESPLOST paid by district
residents. These estimates, therefore, differ across districts by number of households as well as their level
of household wealth.
To account for ESPLOST-eligible purchases that could have been made outside of a resident’s home
school district, we calculated “leaving shares.” These shares are expected to be correlated with the
percentage of a school district’s residents traveling outside of their county to make ESPLOST-eligible
purchases.
Using the Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment data for all employers in Georgia, grocery stores,
gas stations, home stores, department stores, and restaurants were geocoded by their physical location.
Then each census block in Georgia, the smallest geographic unit available, was assigned their closest
business. The ratio of households whose closest grocery store is outside of their home county to the total
number of households in their county is that county’s grocery store “leaving share.” Each school district’s
leaving share is then the weighted average of their leaving shares across the retail types. The annual
housing unit amount of expenditure in that category serves as the weight.
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Table A2. Annual Household ESPLOST-Eligible Expenditures by Income Group
LESS
THAN
$10K

$10K TO
$15K

$15K TO
$20K

$20K TO
$30K

$30K TO
$40K

$40K TO
$50K

$50K TO
$70K

MORE
THAN
$70K

Groceries1

$2,971

$3,211

$3,344

$4,113

$4,422

$4,844

$5,392

$7,367

Clothes

$612

$595

$836

$748

$1,055

$1,341

$1,515

$2,251

Home
Furnishings or
Equipment

$580

$437

$519

$777

$869

$1,051

$1,212

$2,139

Gasoline2

$1,286

$1,295

$1,472

$1,915

$2,331

$2,651

$3,100

$4,454

Utilities3

$2,172

$2,208

$2,607

$3,072

$3,367

$3,406

$3,750

$5,173

Restaurant

$950

$844

$1,046

$1,253

$1,703

$2,062

$2,579

$3,846

Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey Table 3123 southern region by income before taxes: Average annual expenditures and
characteristics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2013-14.
1 Food purchased for at-home consumption is exempt from state sales tax, but local sales taxes are charged on groceries.
2 The Transportation Funding Act of 2015 changed the taxation of motor fuels in Georgia but largely left in place the local sales
taxation on gasoline.
3 This includes purchases of natural gas, electricity, home phones and cell phones, which are all charged local sales taxes.
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